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HANGING IN A BALANCE: FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND RELIGION
Puja Kapai* and Anne S Y Cheung**
"Liberty means responsibility. That is why most men dread
it." - George Bernard Shaw
Abstract
When the liberty to freely express oneself is at odds
with another's right to freedom of religion, we are con-
fronted with the classic dilemma of choosing between two
equally fundamental, constitutionally and internationally
protected rights. The contours of the said two rights how-
ever, are far from clear. Whilst freedom of expression is not
an absolute right, its limits are controversial. Equally,
while it is undisputed that freedom of religion is an interna-
tionally protected human right enshrined in various inter-
national instruments, there is no comprehensive
international treaty which addresses as its subject the con-
tent and extent of the right of freedom of religion, thus it is
uncertain whether it entails the right to have one's relig-
ious faith and symbols protected from insult.
The unsettled boundaries of dispute arising from
the clash between two fundamental rights have led to bitter
tensions between freedom of expression and concerns to
protect and respect religious sentiments. Religious commu-
nities feel outraged that their religious beliefs and sacred
symbols are mocked, insulted, attacked or vilified. Ag-
grieved believers argue that "respect" for religious beliefs
and symbols is fundamental to, and part and parcel of, the
right of freedom of religion and that freedom of expression,
although equally fundamental, is not without its limits. On
the other hand, the authors and creators of these controver-
sial works argue that any law seeking to restrict their
works amounts to a violation of the sacrosanct right of
freedom of expression, which is the bedrock of any demo-
cratic society.
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong.
** Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong.
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These arguments require an exploration of the ra-
tionales underpinning the freedoms of expression and relig-
ion to determine the boundaries and limits of each of these
rights. On the far right, the United States endows the free-
dom of expression with sacrosanct status, which can be
limited only where there is a risk of imminent danger or
physical harm to third parties or a threat of an imminent
outbreak of violence. In marked contrast is the German
model, where an individual's religious sentiments, dignity
and identity are protected from scurrility and ridicule and
any form of degrading speech against any religion is out-
lawed. Lying between these two extremes are the European
Court of Human Rights and the Australian systems which
have endeavored to strike a delicate balance between re-
spect for religious sentiments and free speech. This paper
will bring these perspectives to bear on the challenge of
balancing the rights offreedoms of expression and religion.
Part I of this paper examines the content of the
right to freedom of religion and whether it entails a right to
protection from ridicule, scurrility, vilification and insults
directed at one's religious teachings, symbols or beliefs
from the perspective of international human rights law.
Parts II and III review the approach of regional and na-
tional 'models of regulation' (the United States, Germany,
the European Court of Human Rights, and Australia) to ex-
amine the unique experiences of these systems and the ben-
efits, pitfalls and complexities inherent in legislating
against speech or conduct which 'hurts' the sentiments of
groups or individuals, who find their religious beliefs the
subject of provocative, insulting, vilifying or offensive ex-
pressions. To end this 'clash' between secular libertarians
and the faithful, this paper argues that a contextualized ap-
proach should be adopted in individual cases to carefully
examine the value of the speech concerned, the 'harm'
caused by it, and the position of the targeted individuals,
group or community in that particular society and gener-
ally. It is only through such a contextualized consideration
of the rights concerned, can an appropriate balance be
struck to secure the interests concerned.
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INTRODUCTION
Liberty has been hailed as a prized victory for humankind since the
days of the glorious French revolution. Yet when the liberty to freely ex-
press oneself is at odds with another's right to freedom of religion, we are
confronted with the classic dilemma of choosing between two equally fun-
damental, constitutionally and internationally protected rights. Adding to
the difficulty, the contours of the said two rights are often far from clear.
Whilst most will agree that freedom of expression is not an absolute right,
its limits are controversial. Equally, while it is undisputed that freedom of
religion' is an internationally protected human right enshrined in various
international instruments,2 there is no comprehensive international treaty
which addresses as its subject the content and extent of the right of freedom
of religion,3 thus it is uncertain whether it entails the right to have one's
religious faith and symbols protected from insult. The unsettled boundaries
of dispute arising from the clash between two fundamental rights have led
to bitter tensions between freedom of expression and concerns to protect
and respect religious sentiments in the 21st century. To name but a few
such instances - the Da Vinci Code stretched Catholic imagination and tol-
I See NATAN LERNER, RELIGION, BELIEFS, AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
119-20 (2000) (For the purpose of discussion, the definition of religion is taken to
be any "theistic convictions involving a transcendental view of the universe and a
normative code of behavior, as well as atheistic, agnostic, rationalistic, and other
views in which both elements are absent," which is a generally accepted definition
within the human rights discourse).
2 Article 18 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc A//810 (Dec. 12, 1948); Article 18(1),
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(Mar. 23, 1976). It has also been argued that although these treaties only bind sig-
natories to the respective treaties, some of the rights enshrined in these treaties have
now achieved the status of jus cogens, and therefore, may be correspondingly bind-
ing on non-signatories also.
3 . See Arcot Krishnaswami's Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious
Rights and Practices, UN Sales No. 60.XIV.2 (1960) (There is, however, a 1981
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief. Acceptance of the Declaration, how-
ever, is not mandatory and as such, the Declaration has failed to move forward in
garnering support for a Convention on the matter due to significant divides between
states over critical issues such as the meaning of 'religion' or 'belief' and whether
new or controversial sects or religious movements should also be granted equal
protection). It is notable that there is a 1965 Draft Convention still pending before
the United Nations. See Lerner, supra. note 1, p. 14.
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erance;4 the Danish cartoons which mocked Prophet Mohammed 5 caused a
huge uproar in the Muslim community worldwide,6 with many taking of-
fense and reacting violently; and a fatwa for the death of Salman Rushdie
for his authorship of the Satanic Verses, which has been reissued upon his
Knighthood by the Queen of England.7
Religious communities feel outraged that their religious beliefs and
sacred symbols are mocked, insulted, attacked or vilified. Although histori-
cally, in most countries, the call to protect and respect religious sentiments
stemmed from the archaic blasphemy laws which extended protection only
to the dominant religion of the state (for example, Christianity and Christian
4 MSNBC News Services, Cardinal's Plea: Don't Read "The Da Vinci Code,"
March 16, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7205300/print/1/displaymode/
1098.
5 Muslim Cartoon Fury Claims Lives, BBC.NEws, Feb. 6, 2006. http://news.bbc.
co.uk. (The Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, published twelve cartoons depict-
ing Muhammad and Islam negatively and in the most derogatory manner, ranging
from images of Muhammad with a bomb in his turban to a purported representation
of Muhammad at the gates of heaven stopping suicide bombers stating, 'Stop!
Stop! We have run out of Virgins!' a reward promised to martyrs.); See Manoj
Joshi, "Fact and fiction", THE HINDUSTAN TIMES. February 22, 2006. (As the con-
troversy spread, the storm was further fueled by other cartoons even more dis-
turbing in their associations between Islam, the Prophet and evil, which were not
part of the original 12 cartoons published by Jyllands-Posten.); See Noam Cohen,
Online petition asks Wikipedia to remove pictures of Muhammad, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE. February 5, 2008. http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/02/05/
technology/wiki.php. (More recently, an online protest has been called for against
Wikipedia, the popular internet encyclopedia, to remove its representations of the
Prophet Muhammad which have been taken from medieval scriptures)..
6 See "Rs 51 crore reward for Danish cartoonist's head", INDIAN EXPRESS. Feb-
ruary 18, 2006.(For example, a fatwa (declaration) was issued in India calling for
the execution of cartoonists for a reward of 51 crore Rupees (510 million Rupees));
see also "Bounty Offered on Cartoonists", -HNDUSTAN TIMES. February 18, 2006;
"Death fatwa on cartoonist", THE TIMES OF INDIA. February 21, 2006; "Toon
Trouble Across India", THE TIMES OF INDIA. February 18, 2006.. There were sev-
eral violent attacks on the embassies of European nations, see "Violence Spreads
Over Cartoon Controversy", THE WASHINGTON POST. February 8, 2006;, "At Least
Nine Killed in Libya as Cartoon Protests Escalate" THE GUARDIAN. February 18,
2006. "Danish Embassy in Tehran Attacked ' THE GUARDIAN. February 6, 2005.
7 The Satanic Verses written by Salman Rushdie, was considered insulting and
offensive to many Muslims. As a result, in 1989, President Khomeini issued a
fatwa, a death sentence, against Rushdie.
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beliefs8 in the United Kingdom and its colonies), contemporary calls to halt
insult, ridicule and abuse against the devout rest mainly on the principles of
equal treatment and public order.9 Some aggrieved believers argue that "re-
8 See Leonard Levy, Blasphemy: Verbal Offenses Against the Sacred, from
Moses to Salman Rushdie (The University of North Carolina Press 1995). In En-
gland, the protection of the law of blasphemy extends only to the beliefs of the
Church of England. See R v Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, ex parte Choudhury
[1991] 1 QB 429, where the court ruled that Rushdie's "Satanic Verses" could not
form the basis for a prosecution for blasphemy against Islam. There is ample histor-
ical evidence of the Christian community protesting against distortions or offensive
representations of Christianity in the media, for example, Nikos KAZANTZAKIS, THE
LAST TEMPTATION OF CHRIST (Touchstone 1998); THE LIFE OF JESUS, Jerry
Springer: The Opera, Steward Lee and Richard Thomas. Studio 2ndStage; DAN
BROWN THE DA VINCI CODE A NOVEL (Random House, Inc. 2003); Goldstone,
John. Monty Python's Life of Brian, 1979; ROBERT HARRIS THE GHOST (Simon and
Schuster 2007); among many others. See Church Fights Da Vinci Code Novel,
BBC NEWS, March 15, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/
4350625.stm; Protests as BBC Screens Springer", BBC NEWS, January 10, 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/4154071.stm, Monty Python's Life of
Brian was the Most Controversial Film of its .. , THE GUARDIAN, March 28, 2003.
See also, Danish paper rejected Jesus cartoons, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, February 6,
2006; Austria Arrests British Historian David Irving; charged in denying Holo-
caust, THE CANADIAN PRESS, November 17, 2005 (which clearly depicted the
double standards applied in the West in its protection of Christian sensitivities even
in the face of a right to free speech).
9 For example, the UK Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001 punishes
"religiously aggravated offenses," which emanate from existing offenses, namely,
assault, harassment, criminal damage, and public disorder. Dec. 14, 2001, Chapter
24. Part 5. Where religious hostility is found as the motivating factor behind these
"religiously activated offenses," those convicted are likely to get higher maximum
penalties. However, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which defines "re-
ligious hatred" as hatred against a group of persons on grounds of their religious
belief or lack of it, a much-needed balance is struck in ensuring equality in protec-
tion of diverse communities to foster their peaceful coexistence, by balancing con-
flicting rights carefully to achieve this end. Feb. 16, 2006, Chapter 1. This is
plugged an important gap which existed in the law whereby previously, only mono-
ethnic communities were protected against 'racial' slurs, whereas the religious
groups which were not covered by UK's blasphemy laws, were left without any
recourse under the law. This Act brings to the fore the need for equal protection
against such slurs for both, ethnic and religious groups. The Act, however, does not
define religion or what constitutes a religious belief. In order to constitute an of-
fense, an act must be THREATENING and INTENDED tO stir up religious hatred. More-
over, the act(s) concerned include (but are not limited) any of the following: the use
of words or conduct or display of written material; publishing or distributing writ-
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spect" for religious beliefs and symbols is fundamental to and part and par-
cel of the right of freedom of religion and that freedom of expression,
although equally fundamental, is not without its limits. On the other hand,
the authors and creators of these controversial works argue that any law
seeking to restrict their works amounts toa violation of the sacrosanct right
of freedom of expression, which is the bedrock of any democratic society.
In the face of this dilemma, countries around the world have been
compelled to come up with a solution in the hope of striking the appropriate
balance between the fundamental value of free speech in a community and
the need to protect the free practice of religion. As a corollary, these argu-
ments require an exploration of the rationales underpinning the freedom of
expression and religion to determine the boundaries and limits of each of
these rights.10 On the far right, the United States endows the freedom of
expression with sacrosanct status. This freedom cannot be interfered with
unless there is a risk of imminent danger or physical harm to third parties or
there is a threat of an imminent outbreak of violence. In marked contrast to
this model is Germany, where an individual's religious sentiments, dignity
and identity are protected from scurrility, ridicule and any form of degrad-
ing speech against any religion, is outlawed. Lying between these two ex-
tremes are the European Court of Human Rights and the Australian"
systems which have endeavored to strike a delicate balance between respect
for religious sentiments and free speech. This paper will bring these per-
spectives to bear on the challenge of balancing the rights of freedoms of
expression and religion.
Part I of this paper examines the content of the right to freedom of
religion and whether it entails a right to protection from ridicule, scurrility,
vilification and insults directed at one's religious teachings, symbols or be-
liefs from the perspective of international human rights law. Given the
ten material; the public performance of a play; distributing, showing, or playing a
recording; broadcasting or including a program in a program service; or possession
of written materials or recordings with a view to display, publish, distribute, or
include in a program service. The Act does not apply where words or behaviour are
spoken or occur or are displayed inside a private setting, nor does it apply to cen-
sure, criticism or dislike of a religious belief. The maximum penalty for stirring up
religious hatred is seven years imprisonment.
10 Simon Lee, Law, Blasphemy and the Multi-Faith Society, Commission for Ra-
cial Equality in the United Kingdom 1990, http://chinesesex.herechina.net/
sitearchive/catalystmagazine/catalyst/lawblasphemyandthemultifaithsociety.pdf
I" This paper looks at one instance of Australian legislation governing such
speech in the State of Victoria, see Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001, Sect.
24 (Vict.).
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broad nature of the provisions in international instruments generally, the
lack of a specific international convention addressing these rights in partic-
ular, and the relatively few cases on point before the Human Rights Com-
mittee, the international human rights regime does not provide a definitive
or satisfactory resolution of this clash between fundamental rights. There-
fore, Parts II and III review the approach of regional and national 'models
of regulation' (the United States, Germany, the European Court of Human
Rights, and Australia 2) which have tried to grapple with the controversial
question of balancing the two fundamental rights. Parts II and III also ex-
amine the unique experiences of these systems and the benefits, pitfalls and
complexities inherent in legislating against speech or conduct which 'hurts'
the sentiments of groups or individuals, who find their religious beliefs the
subject of provocative, insulting, vilifying or offensive expressions.
While the American system is focused solely on maintaining public
order, the German system protects religious sensitivities per se. In a sense,
the former may appear to favor groups more prone to violence and ignore
the interests of groups that exercise self-restraint in reacting to scurrilous
and insulting expressions directed at their religion. It aims to protect the
speakers but belittles the audience, groups or individuals who affiliate
themselves with the subject of ridicule.' 3 As such, the American approach
exposes the limitations of liberalism. In contrast, the German approach is
equally unsatisfactory as silencing voices and debates that provoke the sen-
sitivities of believers inevitably result in tight censorship and self-censor-
ship. Although protection against the inhibition of free exercise of religion
which may result from defamatory remarks or highly-provocative language
ridiculing religious beliefs, , it is equally important that the responsible ex-
ercise of freedom of expression be protected in light of its valuable func-
tions in society. To end this 'clash' between secular libertarians and the
faithful, this paper argues that a contextualized approach should be adopted
in individual cases to carefully examine the value of the speech concerned,
the 'harm' caused by it, and the position of the targeted individuals, group
or community in that particular society and generally. This position is fur-
ther discussed in Part IV, V and the Conclusion.
12 The jurisdictions have been chosen with a view to ensure a rich representation
of the different national and / or regional approaches towards the issue so that a
more meaningful conclusion can be derived from an assessment and analysis of
these different systems.
13 This approach also has important implications for the notion of human dignity,
given that for many, one's ability to practice and maintain their religious faiths and
beliefs without shame and ridicule may have important implications for one's per-
ceptions of leading a 'good life' or a 'life of dignity'.
2009
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I. INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE FREEDOMS OF
SPEECH AND RELIGION
Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 14 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 15 ("ICCPR") protect
individuals' rights to the freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of
religion. Article 19 of the UDHR provides every individual with the funda-
mental right to "freedom of opinion and expression" whilst Article 18 pro-
tects the right of "freedom of thought, conscience and religion." Article
18(1) of the ICCPR is crafted in terms identical to the protection of the
freedom of thought, conscience and religion set out in the UDHR, whilst
Article 19(1) of the ICCPR provides that everyone shall have the right to
hold opinions without interference.
Therefore, it is clear that the international community has had a
long held commitment towards protecting both rights as equally fundamen-
tal and belonging to every human being. What remains unclear, however, is
where there is a conflict between these two rights, which of the two should
prevail? Which of the two merits greater protection? The UDHR provides
no direct answer. 16 However, the ICCPR hints that some protection of
groups and individuals from defamation against their religions is war-
ranted. 7 Whilst Article 19 of the ICCPR protects the right of freedom of
expression and opinion, this right must be exercised responsibly. Article
19(3) of the ICCPR provides that this right "may ... be subject to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are
necessary for respect for the rights or reputations of others;18 for the protec-
tion of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals" (emphasis added). Moreover, Article 20(2) of the ICCPR
provides that "[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
14 G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/180 (Dec. 10, 1948).
15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI),
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
(Mar. 23, 1976) [ICCPR]
16 See Louis Henkin, Group Defamation and International Law, in GROuP DEFA-
MATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND
VIOLENCE 123 (Monroe H Freedman & Eric M Freedman eds., 1995). This is true
save and except that UDHR Art. 30 provides that "Nothing in this Declaration may
be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and
freedoms set forth herein," which may be read as offering a general approach to
resolving conflicting fundamental rights.
1' ICCPR supra note 15, at Art. 19(3),
18 For example, this is immediately relevant in the context of proselytization.
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constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be pro-
hibited by law" (emphasis added). Therefore, there is an obligation on the
part of every State party to the ICCPR to ensure that there is a provision in
its domestic law for protection against such incitement on these grounds.
Based on these obligations arising under the ICCPR, there is clearly
a certain degree of international consensus that the right of freedom of re-
ligion must, in order to be meaningfully protected, entail a right to be free
from insults and offense directed at one's religious practices, beliefs or
teachings. 19 The rationale for such inference is not based on any need for
maintaining or showing 'respect' for these beliefs, but that any acts or
speech inhibiting the free exercise of religion (on account of intimidation,
threats, insults or remarks directed at members of the targeted religion)
should be curtailed to the extent necessary to protect the freedom of relig-
ion. The Article 19(3) limitation, coupled with the Article 20(2) require-
ment, signal and mandate State parties to protect these rights. According to
Henkin, however, a state would have exceeded its authority in limiting free-
dom of expression in implementing its Article 19(3) obligations if such a
limitation is not "necessary in a democratic society" whether on grounds of
maintaining public order or national security, etc. .20 In turn, this has a di-
rect bearing on the role of free speech in a democratic society. Respect for
religious sentiments, beliefs or values have never been considered signifi-
cant enough to dethrone the 'royalty' privilege that free speech has enjoyed
to date. Freedom of expression or freedom of speech is said to be the cor-
nerstone of liberalism and democracy. Its value has long been entrenched
by John Milton and J.S. Mill 21 since the days of the Enlightenment. Yet,
19 This interpretation has come about primarily in the context of European Court
of Human Rights decisions relating to freedom of speech and the practice of
proselytization. See Kokkinakis v. Greece, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 397 (1994). This aspect
of curtailing free speech however is even more complicated in practice because the
prohibition of proselytization in some instances may amount to limiting the legiti-
mate practices of certain religious groups whose religions require that its members
proselytize their faith. As such, proselytization as 'speech' generally cannot be pro-
hibited unless it results in the prevention of another person freely practicing their
faith. On this point, see e.g., Peter Edge, The European Court of Human Rights and
Religious Rights, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 680 (1998). See also, infra. note 94 for a
further discussion of Kokkinakis.
20 See Henkin supra note 16, at p. 129. Henkin proposes that because the linita-
tion impinges upon a fundamental human right, the degree of necessity must be
high before it can be legitimized by international law.
21 See JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644) available at http://www.gutenberg.
org/etext/608; JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (first published 1859; Penguin
1985).
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freedom of expression is not an absolute right. It can be limited on grounds
such as defamation, sedition, obscenity and public order, amongst others.
The Human Rights Committee ("HRC") defined the issue of re-
spect for the beliefs and religions of others by reference to the scope of
Article 20 of the ICCPR.22 It focused on the relationship between Article
18(3) and Article 20, and more particularly, the distinction between the lim-
itations permissible under Article 18(3) and Article 20, respectively. Article
20 is stricter than Article 18(3) in the sense that it contains a mandatory
prohibition against particular forms of speech as opposed to an option that
limitations be imposed on various forms of speech on special grounds. 23 It
was initially thought that Article 20 limited free speech with a view to en-
suring respect for the beliefs and religion of others. However, it has since
been recognized that the Article 20 limitation actually restricts free speech
not on grounds of respect for the beliefs and religion of others, but rather on
the right and freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs24 encompassed in
the freedom of religion. That in exercising one's freedom to manifest relig-
ious or other beliefs under Article 18(3), the Article 20 prohibition against
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred shall provide the limiting
parameters for such manifestation.25
The challenge to free speech is whether words or conduct resulting
in insult, intimidation and harassment of religious groups, teachings of a
particular religion or individuals, should be banned or should be protected
as inherently valuable and indispensable to public debate in a democratic
society. This debate has largely been held in the context of legislation in
some European countries which restrict propagation of revisionist ideas,
Holocaust denial or denial of crimes against humanity, which were found to
have occurred, 26 that the protection of the reputation of others has been
heralded as a suitable ground for limiting the right of freedom of expres-
22 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Art. 18 (Forty-eighth session,
1993), The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/2IRev.I/Add.4 at 7 (1993).
23 UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1207 at 23 (1993).
24 Id. at 25, 30 (1993).
25 Id. at 33..
26 I.e. the criminal provisions of the Gayssot Act of France, which made it an
offense to contest the existence of the crimes against humanity tried at Nuremberg
in 1945 and 1946. See Human Rights Committee, Robert Faurisson v. France,
(Communication no. 550/1993), U.N. Doc. A/52/40 at 84 (1999).
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sion. 27 In X v. Germany,28 the applicant was prohibited from asserting that
the Holocaust was part of the deception championed by Zionist crusaders.29
The European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR"), in holding that the need
to protect the reputation of others within Article 1030 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights ("ECHR") justified the restriction against the ap-
plicant's speech, found against the Applicant.3 Thus, although Article 10
(protecting the right to freedom of expression) limits that right where it is
exercised in a manner to hurt the reputation of others (as determined in the
Holocaust denial cases), Article 932, protecting the right of freedom of relig-
ion, does not protect religious beliefs, symbols, or sentiment from ridicule
or insult.
In Robert Faurisson v. France, the HRC found that France could
rely on the limitation provided in Article 19(3)(a) of the ICCPR,33 and in
referring to General Comment No. 1034, the HRC observed that protection of
the rights or reputation of others as a limitation ground may extend not only
to the "interests of other persons [but also] to those of the community as a
whole. ' 35 According to the HRC, "[s]ince the statements made by the au-
thor, read in their full context, were of a nature as to raise or strengthen
anti-Semitic feelings, the restriction served the respect of the Jewish com-
munity to live free from fear of an atmosphere of anti-Semitism. 36 In this
27 Jonathan Cooper and Adrian Marshall Williams, Hate Speech, Holocaust De-
nial and International Human Rights Law, 1999 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 593.
28 X v. Germany, App. No. 9235/81, 29 Eur. Comm H.R. Dec. & Rep. 194 (1982)
(The murder of Jews having been established as a known historic fact).
29 Id.
30 Protecting the right to freedom of expression, among other related rights. See
infra., note 91.
31 In this context, see also, Marias v. France, App. No. 31159/96, 86 Eur. Comm
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 184 (1996); T. v. Belgium, App. No. 9777/82, 34 Eur. Comm
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 158 (1983).
32 Gay News Ltd. v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. 123 (1982); see infra pp.
32,33.
33 Providing that since the exercise of free speech rights carries with it special
duties and responsibilities, the right may be curbed when deemed necessary to "re-
spect [the] rights or reputation of others".
34 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 10, Art. 19 (Nineteenth session,
1983), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 7 at 133 (2w4).
35 Id. at para. 4.
36 Robert Faurisson v. France, (Communication no. 550/1993), U.N. Doc. A/52/
40 at 84 (1999). para. 9.6.
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context however, it is interesting to note that the reference to "respect" by
the HRC refers not to respect for the beliefs of others, but to the need and
right of a community to live free from hatred.37
By extension, it appears that the Article 20 restraint is crafted with
similar limits in mind. However, in light of the interpretation of Article 20
in the HRC's General Comment No. 7 and X. v. Germany, it is encouraging
to note that Article 20 is flexible enough to plug a gap in international law,
if need be. It is especially encouraging since it is the only provision in an
international treaty which entails this protection against hatred. However,
whether this extends to protecting religious groups and their beliefs, sym-
bols and teachings from ridicule is a different question. Clearly, interna-
tional case law to date has focused on respect for religion on the basis that
insults, harassment and other defiling speech against religion should not be
permissible if it impedes free exercise of religion, and not on the basis that
the substance of religion deserves respect. 38
The free exercise of religion is inextricably tied to one's willingness
to associate oneself (whether by practice, belief or participation) with a par-
ticular religion based on its value in the greater community. This willing-
ness stands to be threatened if certain speech vilifying or ridiculing
particular religions is not curbed. Thus, the question is whether the law
should take a step further in curbing such speech recognizing this inherent
connection between respect for religion and the free exercise of religion?
Put differently, is insult and vilification reverse proselytism?
The HRC, unlike its Strasbourg counterpart, has tended to steer
clear of any notion of "respect" for religious beliefs of others as a ground
for limiting freedom of expression.39 The tendency has instead been to im-
pose limitations on the grounds of respect for the "rights and reputations" of
others.40 These limited cases demonstrate the dearth of jurisprudence recog-
nizing the entitlement to respect for one's religion or belief or reading Arti-
cle 18(3) and 20 together in support of such an interpretation. Rather, in the
context of offensive and unpopular speech, members of the HRC have often
17 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977) (This rationale
penetrates the law of defamation which barring fair comments and truthful state-
ments, condemns speech which fails to serve the interests of a democratic
community).
38 See Lerner, supra note 1, at 119.
39 See U.N. HRC, 70th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/701D/736/1997 (Oct. 26, 2000).
40 Id.; See also Article 19(3)(a), ICCPR, available at http://www.hrc.co.nx/home/
hrc/intemationalhumanrights/nzandtheinternationalinstruments/iccprarticle 15-19.
php.
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warned of the dangers of allowing the limitation clauses to be interpreted to
prohibit such speech merely on account of it being offensive or unpopular.4'
Apart from the general rights enshrined in international treaties, va-
rious nations have come together to mark the existence of such a right to
respect for one's religion, religious practices and symbols (which many
have argued to be part and parcel of the freedom of religion) in the 1981
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.42 There is little by way
of guidance, however, as to how such intolerance or discrimination is mani-
fested and how those forms of manifestation ought to be targeted by the
law. Thus, it is largely an expression of a commitment or a will to eradicate
such forms of intolerance or discrimination without much more.
More recently, pitted against the background of the September 11,
2001 attacks against the United States and the subsequent rise of Is-
lamophobia in the West,43 the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR")
passed a resolution entitled "Combating Defamation of Religions" 44 in 2002
and similar resolutions were passed in 2003, 4 5 2004,46 200547 and in 2007, a
draft resolution dated November 2, 2007 was introduced by Pakistan ("the
Resolutions"). Although the Resolutions were passed, noting "with deep
concern the intensification of the campaign of defamation of religions," the
definition of "defamation of religions" was unfortunately limited to "a neg-
ative projection of Islam in the media" and the association of Islam with
human rights abuses and terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11,
2001 attacks. This resulted in most Western countries opposing the 2002
Resolution, as it did not prohibit state-sponsored educational systems that
41 See Robert Faurisson v. France, Communication No. 550/1993, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993(1996) (These warnings are clearly noted in the concurring
opinion of Mssrs. Evatt and Kretzmer and Mr. Lallah).
42 See G.A. Res. 36/55,at 171, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 (Nov. 25 1981); See also
U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/93 (Feb. 29, 1997).
43 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, CHR
Res. 2003/66, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/66 (Apr. 24, 2003); U.N. CHR, 61st Sess.
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/18/Add.4 (Dec. 13, 2004).
44 Combating Defamation of Religion, CHR Res. 2002/9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/
2002/9 (Apr. 15, 2002)..
45 Combating Defamation of Religions, CHR Res. 2003/4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
RES/2003/4 (Apr. 14, 2004)..
46 Combating Defamation of Religions, CHR Res. 2004/6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
RES/2004/6 (Apr. 13, 2004).
47 Combating Defamation of Religions, CHR Res. 2005/3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
RES/2005/3 (Apr. 12, 2005).
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teach prejudice against non-Islamic religions, and more importantly, its fail-
ure to criticize the defamation of other religions apart from Islam. This im-
plies that these Resolutions sanction some forms of religious criticism, but
shield Islam from it. This is clearly inconsistent with the international ideal
of non-discrimination on grounds of religion which ought to apply to bene-
fit all religions.
The Resolutions have been further criticized for the impact they
have had in the signatory countries where anti-religious defamation legisla-
tion has been passed, and instead has been used to curb dissentients' views
of the government. 48 Given the lack of the breadth of the instrument, and
the lack of a clear and well-defined framework of recommended limitations
and the instances in which they may be imposed, such a measure is only
counter-productive and has been abused to infringe the fundamental guaran-
tee of freedom of expression.
Therefore, it is imperative that a more comprehensive, international
legislative code be designed to clearly identify and address the conflict and
tension between these two fundamental rights.
II. THE LIBERALIST CREED OF FREE SPEECH
While an international consensus is yet to be reached, various states
have attempted to resolve the dilemma in their own ways. The following
discusses the American approach towards free speech and the protection of
religious sentiments.
The dilemma between free speech and the protection of religious
sentiments is not new to modern secular society. Dating back to 1676, when
Western society was predominately comprised of Christians, people were
prosecuted for blasphemy. These prosecutions were not only for attacks on
God and religion, but for implied attacks on social order.49 This sentiment
rang true in the United States in 181 1.50 The primary concern was to protect
the hostile majority from being inflamed by verbal insults against their
faith. In the 20th century, the dichotomy between freedom of speech and
48 See, e.g., Dr. Younus Shaikh, Pakistan's Infamous Islamic Blasphemy Laws,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANIST NEWS Feb. 2004, at 6, available at http://www.iheu.
org/node/1006 (criticizing Pakistan's Defamation Bill 2004); See also AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, Amnesty International Annual Report 2003 Updates, May 2003,
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POLIO/006/2003/en/dom-
POL 100062003en.pdf.
19 See Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy,
and the First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REV. 297, at 306 (1988) (discussing the
Taylor's Case).
50 Id. at 315.
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freedom of religion took a new turn when society became less religious. In
Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court interpreted the free exercise of
religion clause in light of the spirit of freedom of speech clause.51. Both
these rights are enshrined in the United States Constitution, and the latter is
understood to include the right to communicate information and opinion.5 2
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, a Jehovah's Witness proselytized on the
streets of a Catholic neighborhood in New Haven by playing songs on a
phonograph. 53 The songs attacked all organized religious systems calling
them Satan's instruments and injurious to man, singling out in particular,
the Catholic Church.54 The hearers were very offended and Cantwell was
charged with the common law offense of inciting a breach of the peace. 55
Despite the fact that hearers testified in court that they felt like hitting
Cantwell, the Supreme Court considered that "there is no showing that
Cantwell's deportment was noisy, truculent, overbearing or offensive... [i]t
is not claimed that he intended to insult or affront the hearers... It is plain
that he wished only to interest them in his propaganda. '56 Therefore,
Cantwell had a right to peacefully impart his view.
In Cantwell, the Supreme Court focuses on the speaker rather than
the offense suffered by the religious audience. The state is only permitted to
interfere if there appears a "clear and present danger of riot, disorder, inter-
ference with traffic upon the public, streets or other immediate threat to
public safety, peace, or order . . .-57 In other words, a strict causal connec-
tion between speech and 'harm' must be established. In addition, Cantwell
requires that "profane, indecent, or abusive remarks" must be "directed to
the person of the hearer. 58
Applying the logic of Cantwell to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,59
where a Jehovah's Witness distributed literature on the streets of Rochester
51 See Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
52 See U.S. CONST. amend I. (The First Amendment stipulates that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.").
53 Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296.
54 Id. at 309.
55 Id. at 300.
56 Id.,at 308-09.
57 Id. at 308
58 Id. at 309.
59 Chaplinsky v. N.Y., 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
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and denounced all religions as a "racket. '60 There, an angry speaker was
successfully prosecuted for shouting offensive words ("God damned racket-
eer" and "a damned Fascist ' 6 1) not against a religious crowd, but against a
law enforcement officer (whom one might expect to display a greater de-
gree of tolerance and self-restraint than ordinary citizens) who was remov-
ing Chaplinsky when the crowd got restless. He was charged and convicted
under New Hampshire law that no person shall address "any offensive, deri-
sive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or
other public place," nor "call him by any offensive or derisive name. '62 The
state court interpreted these words to likely cause a breach of the peace. In
the Supreme Court, Justice Murphy upheld the decision of the state court,
stating that:
[It] is well understood that the right of free speech is not
absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the in-
sulting or 'fighting' words - those which by their very ut-
terance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality. 63
Justice Murphy's famous formulation of "fighting words" requires
an examination of the injury inflicted upon the listeners, the propensity of
the words to incite an immediate breach of the peace, the social interests of
order and morality and the social value of the insulting words uttered. Nev-
ertheless, later developments in American cases have focused only on fight-
ing words that cause an immediate breach of the peace and have narrowed
its scope to words that were uttered on a face to face encounter between the
speaker and the listener. 64
60 Id. at 569.
61 Id.
62 Id.at 568.
63 Id. at 571, 572.
64 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
114 (James W. Ely, Joel B. Grossman & Kermit L. Hall eds., Harvard Univ. Press
1981).
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The unsettling reality of these developments is that, armed with the
First Amendment, a Nazi group was allowed to march through a Jewish
district 65 and a group of white teenagers escaped liability despite burning a
cross on the front yard of an African-American family. 66 Chaplinsky has not
been overruled, but has yet to have been relied upon to sustain any further
convictions.
The combined effect of Cantwell and Chaplinsky is that only
"fighting words," and not a general advocacy of ideas, are likely to incite an
imminent breach of peace that can be regulated. This singular emphasis on
imminent violence has blinded many to other legitimate interests in society
concerning the responsible exercise of free speech rights and the need to
adequately protect and uphold fundamental individual and group rights, in-
cluding the right to freedom of religion.
This formula only protects the speaker from a hostile audience, but
ignores groups or audiences that are unlikely to or lack the capacity to react
in a violent manner or exercise self-restraint. Kent Greenawalt has proposed
the idea of the "equalization of victims" to illustrate the fallacy of the immi-
nent danger test.67 He argues that an insult directed to a man in his twenties,
to an isolated young child or to a woman in a wheelchair, would all have
different implications and would yield different reactions. Hate speech di-
rected at disadvantaged groups would only silence and marginalize them.
Rather than relying on an abstract test of propensity to incite violence,
Greenawalt suggests that an appropriate test would be "whether remarks of
that sort in that context would cause many listeners to respond forcibly. 68
The American approach has assumed that the audience is a generic
whole posing harm to the speaker, where the speaker is unique, and there-
fore his voice must be heard. However, the speaker in reality may not be a
lone individual. The voice may come from an organized group or a com-
mercial entity. In contrast, the direct or indirect subject of the speech may
be a loosely organized minority group or an individual. Under the existing
laws, the ideal of free speech is upheld at the expense of the agony, insult
and indignity which believers and religious followers are expected to toler-
ate. The need to prove an imminent outbreak of violence and disorder fur-
ther ignores the long term harmful effects of such speech on the target
group or the audience. 69 It is known that hate speech is a form of psycho-
65 Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. Of Skokie 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
66 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
67 KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS 52-59 (Princeton University Press
1995).
68 Id. at 53.
69 Id. at 59.
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logical assault on the listeners and on society as a whole, causing its 'vic-
tims' physiological effects such as rapid pulse, breathing difficulaties and
suicidal tendencies. 70 Hate speech reinforces feelings of prejudice and infer-
iority, and contributes to social patterns of domination. American adherence
to the ethos of individualism has failed to explain why the rights of speakers
should always take priority over the interests of those who are the subject or
audience of the speech. 71 American courts are committed to protecting a
speaker from harm inflicted by an angry crowd, but ignore the harmful ef-
fects the speaker causes the subject of the speech and its effects in inciting
others to harm or prejudice the targeted individuals or groups. The debate
has distorted the values of equality and democracy, which require that
"public choice be made with full information and under suitable conditions
of reflection. 72 The market place of ideas, whilst suited to intellectual and
political discourse, is at the same time a most dangerous engine which lends
its support to groups who wish to infiltrate its space with hate speech
against targeted groups in society. As such, it is incapable of providing
corrective justice. Moreover, the lack of regulation of the marketplace of
ideas merely sustains those in power, who have the full means to mould,
shape and influence the ideologies traded.
III. DUE RESPECT TO THE FAITHFUL
In contrast, other countries have concluded that speech based on
inciting racial or religious hatred should be prohibited to protect and uphold
the sacrosanct values of equality and dignity which lie at the core of these
societies. While the American courts consider liberty to be paramount, the
German legal system values human dignity and honor above anything else.
Article 1 of the German Constitution stipulates clearly that it is the duty of
all state authorities to respect and protect human dignity.73 Article 1 further
acknowledges "inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of
every community, of peace and of justice in the world. '74 Article 5 of the
Constitution protects one's right to "freely express and disseminate his
70 Id. at 53.
71 OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 3 (Harvard Univ. Press1998)
(1996).
72 Id. at 23. See also, Steve Heyman, Hate Speech, Public Discourse and the First
Amendment (July 29, 2008). Extreme Speech and Democracy, Ivan hare, James
Weinstein, eds,, Oxford University Press, forthcoming, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1186262 (discussing the misplaced emphasis and belief in the idea that
maximizing access to the market place will result in the discovery of 'truth.').
73 GRUNGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 1 (F.R.G.).
74 Id.
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opinions in speech, writing, and pictures. ' 75 This right is, however, subject
to the protection of the "right to personal honor. 76
While it may be tempting to attribute the German position to its
horrific history, scholars have traced the roots of the German protection of
dignity and honor in continental philosophy and tradition.77 The German
system has embraced Kantian philosophy, which puts human dignity and
self-realization at its core.78 According to James Whitman, the Continent,
including Germany, used dueling law to defend honor in the nineteenth cen-
tury. 79 Whitman further points out that German society has sophisticated
and elaborate rules on social etiquette80 and the right to privacy is largely
based on the concern to protect one's self image.8' Thus, respect for indi-
viduals and groups is an indispensable legal right.
Germany is not only famous for its heavy regulation of hate speech
against Jews, 82 which provides that Holocaust denial is a crime; 83 hate
75 Id. at art 5.
76 Id. (Article 5 of the Constitution reads "(1) Every person shall have the right to
freely express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing, and pictures and to
inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of
the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guar-
anteed. There shall be no censorship. (2) These rights shall find their limits in the
provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and in
the rights to personal honour. (3) Art and scholarship, research, and teaching shall
be free. The freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the
constitution.").
77 See infra notes 78 and 79.
78 Claudia E. Haupt, Regulating Hate Speech - Damned If you Do and Damned if
You Don't: Lessons Learned from Comparing the German and U.S. Approaches,
23 B.U. . INT'L L. J. 299, 314 (2005). See also James Q. Whitman, The Two West-
ern Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty, 113 YALE L. J. 1153 at 1181
(2004).
79 See Whitman, supra note 71, 1166 (on dueling) and 1186-90 (on hate speech
regulation) (focusing mainly on privacy, he also discusses the rationale behind hate
speech regulation in Germany).
80 Id. at 1168-69 (Explaining that German journalists have their little etiquette
book of press law, in which the standard of privacy is treated as an issue of good
manners).
81 Id. at 1167-8.
82 See Haupt, supra note 71, 323-332.
83 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Nov. 13, 1998. English translation of
§§130, 185, 189 and 194 of the German Criminal Code, English translation by the
German Federal Ministry of Justice available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/
statutes/StGB.htm#319.
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speech against religious groups or believers is also strictly prohibited.
Under Section 130(2) of the German Criminal Code, it is a crime to incite
hatred which calls for "violent or arbitrary measures against [any religious
group], or which assault[s] the human dignity of others by insulting, mali-
ciously maligning or defaming segments of the population or. . .the
group. '84 Imprisonment for this offense ranges from three months to five
years.85 Under § 166 of the Criminal Code, "whoever publicly or through
dissemination of writings insults the content of another's religious faith... is
capable of disturbing the public peace and shall be punished with imprison-
ment of not more than three years or a fine. '86 There is no need to prove
causation of or likelihood of imminent violence, save that there is this re-
quirement that the writing be 'capable' of disturbing public peace. 87
In 2006, a German who printed the words "Koran, the Holy Koran"
on rolls of toilet paper was found guilty under Section 166 of the Criminal
Code for dissemination of materials containing writings or insults against
other faith which is capable of disturbing public peace. 88 The accused had
printed these words and sent the toilet paper to 22 mosques and to German
television stations, provoking an outcry in Islamic countries. 89 His act was
condemned by Iranian diplomats in Germany. The potential to disrupt order
was sufficient for the court to rule that the accused was culpable.90 The
conviction earned him a sentence of 300 hours of community service and a
suspended prison sentence of one year.91 The Danish government discontin-
ued an investigation against Jyllandsposten for possible violations of the
Danish Criminal Code for publishing twelve cartoons that depicted the
Prophet Mohammed in a degrading manner on the grounds of press free-
84 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] 15, May 1871, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI
127; Neubekanntmachung 13, Nov., 1998, BGBL. I 3332; Zuletz geaendert dutch,
Oct., 2006, BGBI. I 2350 at 2352. German Criminal Code, promulgated on Nov.
13, 1998; Federa Law Gazette I at 945, English version provided by the German
Federal Ministry of Justice available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.
htm
85 Id.
86 Id. at § 166.
87 Id.
88 Staatsanwaltschaft MUnster, AZ: 540 Js 1309/05. See Suspended Prison for
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dom and public interest. 92 In contrast, the German government pressed
charges against Die Welt, a German, newspaper which published the same
cartoons.
93
Before modem sensitivity towards the Muslim community in the
21st century, offensive speech against Christians rendered one criminally
liable under Section 166 of the Criminal Code. This includes the portrayal
of a crucifix as a mouse trap,94 calling Christian churches "gangs of
criminals," 95 and the portrayal of a pig on a crucifix printed on a T-shirt;
96
this last image was disseminated on the internet. In all the examples cited,
incitement to violence was not a required element. The prime concerns were
the sentiments, honor and dignity of the attacked group.
The downside of German approach is that speech and expression
may be unnecessarily and excessively inhibited, for it may be difficult to
draw a clear distinction between unfavorable comments capable of resulting
in a breach of the peace and mere criticism or insult. The offensive expres-
sion need not be targeted at an individual or a particular group. In protect-
ing the sensibilities and dignity of the religious, any offensive expression
against that school of thought or belief systems is amenable to criminal
prosecution. It is interesting that there is a strict prohibition of any such
statements as long as they are "public"; also noteworthy is that there is no
emphasis that the insult, threat or degradation be intentional. It is sufficient
if the "conduct" or "words" are found to amount to an insult, threat or
degradation.
Moreover, public good or interest is not a defense in German law.
Another criticism of the German approach is that it is unjustifiably favors
92 See Decision from Danish Government, Response by the Danish Government to
the letter of 24 Nov., 2005 from UN Special Rapportuer on Freedom of Religion
and Belief Ms Asma Jahingir, and UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary
Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Mr.
Doudou Diene, regarding cartoons representing the Prophet Mohammed published
in a newspaper, Jan. 23, 2006 available at http://www.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/
00D9E6F7-32DC-4C5A-8E24-FOC96E813C06/0/060123final.pdf. (Where section
140 of the Danish Criminal Code punishes "any person, who in public, ridicules or
insults the dogmas of worship of any lawfully existing religious community." Sec-
tion 266b further criminalizes "the dissemination of statements or other informa-
tion, by which a group of people are threatened, insulted or degraded on account of
their religion).
93 Staatsanwaltschaft Berlin, Az.: Js 350 350/06.
94 LG Bochum, NJW 1989, 728.
95 LG Goettingen, NJW 1985, 1654.
96 LG Nurenberg, NStZ-RR 1999, 238.
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religious over secular beliefs and results in overly-broad censorship.97 This
discriminates against secular groups by not proffering them any protection
under the law against insults, degrading remarks against people of their
kind on account of their being non-religious or members of a non-religious
group that may be the subject of insults or attacks. For instance, the
Deutsche Opera in Berlin, exercised self-censorship in September 200698
when it decided to cancel the Mozart opera Indomeneo, fearing that show-
ing the fake severed heads of Jesus, Buddha, and the Prophet Mohammed
would cause outrage in German society. 99 In particular, they were afraid of
offending the Muslim community. It was only after the Chancellor con-
demned the Opera House for practicing self-censorship, l00 and much public
outcry, that the performance was resumed. 01
IV. STRIKING THE DIFFICULT BALANCE
Lying between the two extremes of the American and German ap-
proaches are the approaches of the ECtHR and Australian courts, both toe-
ing a fine line between the liberalists and the religionists. Like the UDHR
and the ICCPR, the ECtHR also protects the rights of freedom of thought,
conscience and religion (Article 9)102 and freedom of expression (Article
97 See Bede Harris, Pell v. Council of Trustees of the National Gallery of Victoria
- Should Blasphemy be a Crime? The 'Piss Christ' Case and Freedom of Expres-
sion, 22 MELB. U. L. REV. 217 at 222-23 (1998). (Harris did not write about the
German experience but his discussion on blasphemy law is equally applicable in
the context of this paper).
98 See Matthew Westphal, Out of their Heads: Props at Centre of Berlin
Idomeneo Controversy Disappear, Playbill Arts (Dec. 8, 2006 available at http:/
www.playbillrarts.com/news/article/print/5707.html. (In Idomeneo, a Mozart opera,
there is a scene showing the 'severed heads' of Muhammad, Jesus, the Buddha and
the ancient Greek god, Poseidon. In September 2006, the Deutsche Opera Berlin
decided to cancel the performance scheduled for November 2006. After much pub-
lic criticism condemning the self-censorship exercised by the company, the
Deutsche Opera decided to reschedule the performance which was eventually
shown on December 18, 2006).
99 BBC News, Beheaded Prophet Opera Dropped, Sept. 26, 2006, http:/lnews.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/5382554.stm.
100 David Flicking and Agencies, Merkel voices concern over opera cancellation,
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Sept. 27, 2006, http://arts.guardian.co.uk/news/story/0,,
1882222,00.html.
101 Westphal, supra note 85.
102 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, ETS 155 Article 9 ("(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief
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10).103 "The ECtHR has recognized that Article 9 protects the dignity of an
individual by allowing him or her to act in consonance with his or her con-
science and that to force individuals to act contrary to their conscience
would be equivalent to stripping them of their inherent dignity and some-
thing which was a fundamental part of their identity."10
4
Various ECtHR decisions have centered upon the distinction be-
tween Article 9 and Article 10 rights in considering the extent to which
Article 10 rights need to be restricted in order to protect another person's
Article 9 rights. The ECtHR has attempted to strike a balance between the
two by extending the protection afforded under Article 9 to protect the re-
ligious feelings and sentiments of adherents of religious faiths which at
times become the target of offensive speech. 10 5
Article 10 jurisprudence has made clear that the "duties and respon-
sibilities" entailed in the right of freedom of expression require that speech
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance; (2)
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limita-
tions as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.").
103 Id. at Article 10 of the ECHR, (While granting a general right of freedom of
expression, provides as follows: "The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries
with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartial-
ity of the judiciary" (emphasis added)).
104 Kokkinakis v. Greece,, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 397 (1994). (A decision that concerned
proselytism as "free speech" versus the right to proselytize under the umbrella of
religious duty in exercising one's right to manifest their religious belief pursuant to
the right of freedom to religion. The right to proselytize as an aspect of manifesta-
tion of one's religious freedom necessarily carries with it certain implications as to
the freedom of religion rights of others, namely, to be "free" from coercive speech
seeking to "convert" the listener, or to the extent that the act of proselytizing "in-
fringes" another's freedom of religion right. A further angle from which issues
arising out of the right to proselytize have been examined is in relation to Article 10
freedom of expression rights.).
105 Id.
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be of "value" to society as a whole. 106 Thus, speech is more likely protected
when it contributes to public debate or enhances the exercise of other civil
and political rights. It is least likely to be protected when the speech form
and content threaten others' exercise of their rights under the ECHR.
Moreover, Article 10 rights may be subject to restrictions that are
"prescribed by law" and "necessary in a democratic society." 10 7 Therefore,
all restraints on speech are evaluated against this standard. This two-pro-
nged test requires that the restriction on the speech be one which is pre-
scribed by law, i.e. that it should be a limitation which has observed the
minimal standards of the rule of law in that it emanates from the "sover-
eign" with the power of imposing and executing laws and that it pursues a
legitimate aim and is not one based on the whims of the sovereign. Thus,
legislation is first evaluated to meet a basic standard of "legality" and
"legitimacy."
Second, the restriction must be one which is "necessary in a demo-
cratic society"'1 8, that is the restriction is weighed against the aim of the
legislation to gauge the proportionality of the response of the law in light of
its aim or goal to limit such speech. All restrictions are assessed to deter-
mine whether they pursue a "pressing social need" and whether they are
restrictive in only the most minimal manner in the pursuit of that need and
whether the effect on the rights of those affected are proportionate to the
objective pursued.109 If the restriction exceeds the measures required in or-
der to achieve the purposes of such limitation, the law is usually struck
down for being disproportionate given the importance of the right to free
speech.
Recent jurisprudence on the exercise of Article 9 and Article 10
rights reflects increasing latitude granted to member states based on the
doctrine of "margin of appreciation" in determining standards for imple-
menting ECHR rights, especially rights related to religion or culture. Given
the aforementioned, this court's jurisprudence reflects the emphasis placed
on the 'instrumental' value of the right of free speech. The margin of appre-
ciation doctrine has been applied most broadly to speech contributing to
matters of public interest, and less expansively to speech resulting in per-
sonal, cultural or emotional enrichment of the community or speech which
is gratuitously offensive.
106 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
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The first in a series of cases exploring the interplay between the two
rights in the context of the "duty" of the state (if any) to prohibit offensive
speech against religions or religious beliefs, was Gay News Ltd. and Lemon
v. United Kingdom, 0 in which the ECtHR examined the common law of-
fense of blasphemy. In this case, a publication, primarily aimed at homo-
sexual readership, contained a poem detailing alleged homosexual practices
of Christ.' The applicants were convicted of a criminal charge pursuant to
the law and they claimed that their Article 9 and Article 10 rights had been
violated. 112 However, the ECtHR limited its examination of the applicants'
claim to Article 10 rights only since the applicants had failed to establish
that the publication of the poem amounted to the exercise of their religious
or other belief under Article 9.113
The ECtHR was of the view that the central purpose of the law used
to prosecute the applicant had the legitimate aim "to protect the rights of
citizens not to be offended in their religious feelings by publications." 114 It
further expressed the view that,
[i]f it is accepted that the religious feelings of the citizen
may deserve protection against indecent attacks on matters
held sacred by him, then it can also be considered as neces-
sary in a democratic society to stipulate that such attacks, if
they attain a certain level of severity, shall constitute a
criminal offense triable at the request of the offended
person. 15
Despite the fact that there is nothing in Article 9(1) which suggests that
there is a "right of citizens not to be offended in their religious feelings,"
the ECtHR's judgment seems to allude to such a right within Article 9 by
implication. 116
This view has been further developed in a string of subsequent
ECtHR decisions, commencing with Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria,' '1
which concerned a ban imposed on a film before its first day of screening.
The film Das Liebeskonzil ("Council in Heaven") was to be shown in the
11" Gay News Ltd, 5 Eur. Ct. HR. .123 (1982).
"' Id.
112 Id.
"3 Id. at 132.
114 Id, at 131.
115 Id, at 130.
116 Id.
117 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 34 (1995).
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Tyrol region which was predominantly Catholic.' 18 The film contained of-
fensive characterizations of God, Jesus and Mary, such that the national
court in Austria determined that the conduct amounted to the criminal of-
fense of disparaging religious precepts as stipulated under section 188 of its
Penal Code. 119 The applicant claimed that the Austrian Government's
seizure and ban against the film violated its right of freedom of expression
pursuant to Article 10.120 The government however, claimed that the action
pursued a legitimate aim of "protection of the rights of others," especially
the right to "respect for one's religious feelings." 121 The court held that a
justification for the ban could be made pursuant to Article 10(2), as the film
was likely to infringe 'the rights of others' ". . .as is borne out by the word-
ing itself of Article 10 para. 2, whoever exercises the rights and freedoms
enshrined in [Article 10(1)] undertakes 'duties and responsibilities. ' 22
Amongst them - in the context of religious opinions and beliefs - may
legitimately include an obligation to avoid as far as possible expressions
that are gratuitously offensive to others, and thus an infringement of their
rights, and which do not contribute to any form of public debate capable of
furthering progress in human affairs."1 23
The ECtHR further added that the justification behind restricting
the free speech of those concerned here was the need "to protect the rights
of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings by the public expres-
sion of views of other persons."' 124 Thus, it appears that the ECtHR supports
the view that expression which is merely gratuitous and does not contribute
to public debate in a given society is not worthy of protection under Article
10 if it offends the religious sentiments and beliefs of others.
There are problems which arise out of such an open-ended ap-
proach and the "loose" wording employed by the court in crafting this new
ground of protection and justification. Who determines whether expression
is merely gratuitously offensive or sufficiently valuable in terms of its con-
tribution to public discourse? Moreover, are all forms of expression capable
of such "value"? For example, what is the "contribution value" of a form of
art, such as a painting or a play? These would most likely be viewed merely




121 Id, at 10.
122 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, ETS 155 Article 10.
123 Id, at 11.
124 Id, at 10.
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ing to the terms of the court, would be less worthy of protection as "free
speech" because its content was offensive to some members of the pious
community and the speech did not add value to public discourse.
Moreover, this poses the grave risk and likelihood of the imposition
of ex post facto liability arising out of an analysis of the effect of the speech
on the hearer rather than a predictable standard which speakers can adjudge
for themselves. Moreover, if "religious" sentiments and beliefs are pro-
tected from ridicule, what about the beliefs of those who are non-religious?
They may hold just as sternly to their beliefs, and arguably, may also be
entitled to protection of their "feelings or sentiments" regarding their cho-
sen way of life or beliefs. 125 A further problem posed by this approach is the
limitless "categories" of people with deeply held beliefs, which may be able
to lay claim to protection by extension since restricting protection to those
with religious beliefs would amount to discrimination against those groups
who are non-religious.
The Court did, however, recognize the fact that not all forms of
criticism will infringe on the "rights of others," which it acknowledged was
a very broadly-cast right. It stated that:
[t]hose who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest
their religion, irrespective of whether they do so as mem-
bers of a religious majority or minority cannot reasonably
expect to be exempt from all criticism. They must tolerate
and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and
even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their
faith. However, the manner in which religious beliefs and
doctrines are opposed or denied is a matter which may en-
gage the responsibility of the State, notably its responsibil-
ity to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the right guaranteed
under Article 9 to the holders of those beliefs and doctrines.
Indeed, in extreme cases the effect of particular methods of
opposing or denying religious beliefs can be such as to in-
hibit those who hold such beliefs from exercising their free-
dom to hold and express them. 126
125 If this argument is upheld, there are strong grounds to protect homosexuals or
other minority groups from insults, ridicule and degradation on the grounds that
certain statements may hurt their sentiments and if belief systems are what are
being singled out for protection here, there may be a vast variety of belief systems
vying for such protection.
126 Id, at 10.
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This again, alludes to the notion that although citizens have the
right of freedom of expression, this right must be exercised responsibly and
with due respect for the rights of others. Thus, the ECtHR concluded that
the Austrian government had pursued a legitimate aim in that "respect for
the religious feelings of believers as implicitly guaranteed in Article 9 can
legitimately be thought to have been violated by provocative portrayals of
objects of religious veneration." 127 The ECtHR appears to have borrowed
from its judgment in the Kokkinakis'28 case where it discussed extensively
the notion of "respect." It is very likely that the fact that the region con-
cerned was predominantly Catholic was a motivating factor for the Court's
determination that a complete ban was a "proportionate" response and "nec-
essary in a democratic society."' 129
The approach of the ECtHR in Otto Preminger was followed again
in Wingrove v. United Kingdom.1 30 This case concerned a film called "Vi-
sions of Ecstasy" and it contained erotic portrayals of St Teresa of Avila.131
The film was refused a British Board of Film Censors Certificate on the
grounds that the content of the film was blasphemous. 132 Much of the case
before the ECtHR centered upon the out-datedness and inappropriateness of
the British law of blasphemy. The ECtHR departed slightly from its ap-
proach in the Otto Preminger case, going a step further in stating that the
purpose pursued by the censor board was to protect against the treatment of
a religious subject in such a manner that was bound to outrage Christian
believers and their values because of the "contemptuous, reviling, insulting,
scurrilous or ludicrous tone, style and spirit in which the subject was
presented."' 133
It is difficult to determine whether the approach of the ECtHR re-
sulted from its deference to the United Kingdom's blasphemy laws, given
the "cultural" nature of the speech or the margin of appreciation granted to
its government for its rationale in restricting such speech. Furthermore, it is
also difficult to discern the position of speech which has "cultural" value or
contributes to debates regarding the values of a people. Such speech is less
valuable in its contribution to public debate compared to political speech,
yet it deserves greater protection than other speech which is completely
127 Id.
128 Kokkinakis, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 397 (1994)
129 This is the two-limb test which must be met by a country to justify the legiti-
macy of the curtailing legislation.
130 Wingrove v United Kingdom (No. 23), 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1937, 1978.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at para. 15.
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devoid of value; such as obscene or racist expressions. Yet it is unclear
where cultural or even artistic expression sits along this spectrum.
However, the decision of the ECtHR in Murphy v Ireland'3 4 has,
led to further confusion as to the requisite standards of the Article 10 test
before it can be applied to allow or restrict speech. In Murphy, the ECtHR
upheld a limited prohibition against an independent local commercial radio
station's advertisement with religious content. 135 The Court's view of the
concept of "respect" as put forward in Kokkinakis and further developed in
Otto-Preminger was overbroad. The radio station in Murphy advertised a
video to be presented during Easter about the evidence of the resurrec-
tion.' 36 There was no discussion of the religious beliefs of others or the truth
or merits of other religious beliefs save and except to the extent that the
advertisement suggested that Christ was the only son of God. Thus, the
content of the advertisement was mainly informational, however. Implicitly,
it alluded to a belief that would be discussed in the video. The ECtHR
discussed the notion of respect for the religious beliefs of others and it ap-
pears that this is the only ground on which the Irish ban on the religious
advertising was upheld. However, it is questionable whether the legitimate
aims pursued by the Austrian government in protecting the religious feel-
ings of Catholics in Otto-Preminger, and the UK government in protecting
the religious feelings of Christians in Wingrove, can be called on to justify
the blanket ban against religious advertising here. This was clearly a con-
tent-based restriction imposed merely on account of there being some "re-
ligious" content to the message. The Irish government submitted that in
light of the history of religious conflict in Ireland, this blanket ban was
sufficiently justified. 3 7
The minimal and most indirect suggestion by way of implication is
that the truth of one set of religious beliefs necessarily implies the untruth
of another. If this suggestion is capable of amounting to the opposition or
denial of others' religious beliefs, then virtually any teaching, statement or
proclamation about the truth of one religion (even if made without reference
to any other religious or belief system) would necessarily entail a denial of
the latter. Thus, the Court ought to have based its decision on other more
sensible justifications, such as the need to regulate religious advocacy in
commercial settings, so that the rich or majority religious groups do not
have an unfair advantage over the "poorer" or less influential within the
community in getting their views across.
134 Murphy v. Ireland, 2003 -IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 31.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id., at para. 38, 40.
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It is suggested that the ECtHR needs to establish clearer standards
for determining what expressions? are to be tolerated and those which gov-
ernments should be entitled to restrict on account of Article 9 rights. In the
context of injury to religious feelings and sentiments, a more accurate and
precise test, and one which is less likely to restrict speech which is "gratui-
tously" offensive but "valuable" in its own right in that it promotes a rich
exchange of ideas within a community, would be to restrict speech only if it
is maliciously intended to cause injury or harm to the religious sentiments
of others. Moreover, the degree of insult needs to be particularized to be so
serious such that only deeply insulting, contemptuous, reviling, scurrilous
or ludicrous 138 speech is found to be offensive and thus, undeserving of
protection under Article 10. In Otto-Preminger, the ECtHR condemned
speech that is "gratuitously offensive" without defining the meaning of the
term. It is said that offensiveness has to reach a "level of savagery" before it
would be silenced. 139 The term "savagery" only adds more color than clarity
to what constitutes gratuitous offensiveness. The facts of Otto-Preminger
and Wingrove involve artistic and provocative plays or movies to be shown
with restrictive viewership and/or with prior warning of the offensive nature
of the content, yet both were completely banned. 140 Scholars have criticized
the standard set in Otto-Preminger as vague and broad. 141 In essence, Otto-
Preminger protects -the believers' feelings from offense or insult. This is
contradictory to the landmark ruling in Handyside which states that speech
that offends, shocks and provokes has its innate and emotive values to be
protected. 142.
Fenwick and Phillipson argue convincingly that a better test would
be to outlaw speech that would incite religious hatred rather than merely or
gratuitously offensive speech. 143 Expression of prejudice, a desire to domi-
nate, or denial of equal respect is contradictory to the value of free
138 See Wingrove, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1937; see also. Otto-Preminger-Institut 19
Eur. Ct. H.R. 34 (1995).
139 HELEN FENWICK & GAVIN PHILLIPSON, MEDIA FREEDOM UNDER THE HUMAN
RIGHTS ACT 485 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
140 See Wingrove, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at para.58, 60
141 See CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 71 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001); Edge, supra., note 19 at 681.
142 Handyside v. United Kingdom. App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737 at para
49, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkpl97/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&
table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=84&sessionld=9975100
&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true (Discussing the protection of offensive speech).
143 FENWICK & PHILLIPSON, supra note 110 at 501.
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speech; 144 disrupting harmony in a multi-ethnic and multi-faith society. The
harm caused to individuals, to specific religious groups, and to the entire
society, outweighs the value of protecting the speech itself. They further
point out that the prohibition against religious hate speech should. only be
limited to speech directed at non-believers but not the religious believer of
the religion subjected to such speech.145 It is the non-believers that are rele-
vant because protecting believers from being offended will be casting too
wide the net. Moreover, the perception of believers is likely to be highly
subjective and sensitive. However, the lack of value of speech which incites
hatred, whether against believers or non-believers, is a non-argument since
the relevant test proposed is not one of the 'effect' on the feelings or sensi-
bilities of the groups which are the subject of the slur but rather, the conse-
quences of such speech on the group, including its dignity and standing in
the community. It is this which is perceived as harmfully divisive in any
democratic, multiethnic community. As the ECtHR's jurisprudence in this
regard continues to evolve, it is hoped that the questions and remaining
gaps in the law highlighted above are addressed in time.
Australia is another jurisdiction which has taken a middle-ground
view in striking this delicate balance. The general approach in Australia is
to treat offensive speech against religious groups or individuals as part of its
discrimination law; 146 only in the state of Victoria are religious individuals
or groups are protected by specific anti-vilification law, governed by the
Racial and Religious Tolerance Act ("the Act"), enacted in 2001.147 The
preamble of the Act states that "Parliament recognizes that freedom of ex-
pression is an essential component of a democratic society," and that the
"right of all citizens to participate equally in society" is an important
value. 148 Paragraph three of the Preamble further states that vilifying con-
duct diminishes the "dignity, sense of self-worth and belonging to the com-
munity" of an individual and the groups concerned, and it is contradictory
to the principle of democracy. 149 Thus, one could say that the Victorian
approach makes a conscious attempt to combine the liberty principle of free
speech and the value of human dignity.
144 Id..
145 Id.
146 Anna Chapman and Kathleen Kelly, Australian Anti-Vilification Law: A Dis-
cussion of the Public/Private Divide and the Work Relations Context, 27 Sydney L.
Rev. 1, 203, (2005).
147 Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, 2001,
148 Id. Preamble at para. 1.
149 Id. at para. 3.
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Directed at stamping out offensive speech, Section 8 of the Act
stipulates that "a person must not, on the ground of the religious belief or
activity of another person or class of persons, engage in conduct that incites
hatred against, serious contempt for, or revulsion or severe ridicule of, that
other person or class of persons." 150 This includes the use of the internet or
e-mail to publish or transmit statements or other material. Contravention of
the Act could result in civil liability or criminal punishment with a prison
term of up to six months.15 1 The latter is limited to intentional conduct,
which the offender knows is likely to incite hatred against the person or the
group, and is likely to threaten or incite others to threaten physical harm to
the persons concerned or to their property. 152 The defenses recognized
under Section 11 of the Act are that the person acted reasonably and in
good faith for artistic work; that the expression was for "genuine academic,
artistic, religious or scientific purpose;" for any purpose in the public inter-
est; or for the purpose of "making or publishing a fair and accurate report of
any event or matter of public interest."' 153
At the time of writing, only two cases on religious hatred were
heard before the Victorian Court. In Judeh v. Jewish National Fund of Aus-
tralia Inc., the complainant, of Palestinian descent, complained of a
monthly advertisement posted by the respondent association calling for do-
nation to Israel as part of one's will; as part of the advertisement, a map of
Israel was delineated. 154 The complainant claimed that the advertisement
amounted to inciting hatred against the race of Arab Palestinians. 155 Apply-
ing the test of reasonable and objective standard, 156 the Court dismissed the
case as frivolous and vexatious.
A more controversial case was that of Islamic Council of Victoria v.
Catch the Fire Ministries Inc., where two evangelical pastors organized a
seminar comparing the Muslim faith with Christianity.157 . In the seminar,
they made remarks that Islam and Muslims endorsed the killing and en-
slavement of whole groups of people based upon their religion. 58 They also
150 Id. at §8
151 OffenseoffenseRacial and Religious Tolerance Act, 2001, §§ 24, 25 (Vic).
152 Id. § 24.
153 Id. at §11
154 See Juden v. Jewish Nat'l. Fund of America Inc. (2003) 1254 VCAT paras. 1,
47.
155 Id.
156 Id., para. 41.
157 Catch the First Ministries Inc. & Ors v. Islamic Council of Victoria Inc. (2006)
284 VSCA para 1, 207.
158 Id.
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characterized the Prophet as a paedophile.159 Part of their remarks were
published in pamphlets and posted on the internet. They were found to have
violated the Act and were ordered to pay a fine of about US$52,000 by the
Administrative Tribunal. 160 The respondents defended their remarks on the
grounds that the seminar was concerned with their religious faith and was a
bona fide religious activity. Although the total cost of the case amounted to
US$750,000 for the two hearings before the Tribunal, the pastors vowed
that they would rather go to jail than to apologize and pay the fine. After a
dramatic turn, the decision was overturned by the Victorian Supreme Court
in 2006.161
The main grounds of appeal concerned the correct interpretation of
the test of incitement under Section 8, the defense allowed pursuant to Sec-
tion 11 and whether both Sections 8 and 11 had infringed the constitutional
right of freedom to communicate with respect to political and governmental
matters. 162 On a careful reading of s. 8(1), the court had to decide (1)
whether "on the ground of religious belief' requires a causal connection
between the impugned conduct and the religious belief or activity to which
the section refers; and (2) whether the test of inciting hatred is based on an
objective standard of the reasonable audience or reader. 163
On the first issue, Justice Nettle ruled that "on the ground of one's
religious belief' does not require any strict causal connection between a
person's religious belief and the consequent act of incitement. 64 The test
was not that "the act of the discriminator be activated by the status or pri-
vate life of the person alleged to be discriminated against." 165 All that is
required is that a "material difference in treatment be based on the status or
private life of the person less favorably treated." Furthermore, the Court
specifically spelt out that "on the ground" does not refer to the subjective
intention or motive of the inciter; it is only relevant when determining the
sentence or penalty but is not a condition for imposing liability., 66 In the
opinion of Justice Neave, the focus should be on "the ground on which
people [are] exposed to the alleged inciter's words or conduct," and not the
ground which caused the alleged inciter to act. 167
159 Islamic Council of Victoria Inc., [2003] VCAT 1753 para. 4.
160 Id.




165 Id. at para.. 22.
166 Id., paras. 22-23.
167 Id., para. 160.
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On the second issue of the test of incitement, the Court held that it
is sufficient that incitement is likely to occur by the natural and ordinary
effect of the words or conduct of the inciter directed at any ordinary mem-
ber of the likely audience. The characteristics of the audience and the his-
torical and social context in which the words are spoken or the conduct
occurs must be taken into account. 168
On the available defenses allowed under Section 11, the Court ruled
that the requirement of "good faith" will be satisfied if the conduct is en-
gaged in for a genuine religious purpose, accompanied by the defendant's
subjective honest belief that it is necessary or desirable to achieve the genu-
ine religious purpose.169 As to what constitutes "reasonably," the Court con-
cluded that this must be decided according to whether it would be so
regarded by "reasonable persons in general judged by the standards of an
open and just multicultural society."'170 The standards of such a society nec-
essarily allows for differences in views about religions. 171
As to the last issue concerning the constitutionality of Section 8, the
Court concluded that it hardly burdens freedom of communication about
political matters. 7 2 Even if it does, the statute has served a legitimate end
by preventing religious vilification in a manner compatible with the consti-
tutionality of a representative and responsible government. 173
Applying this analytical framework to the case, the Court held that
the comments were uttered by the defendants in a seminar addressed at a
mainly Christian audience, with only three Muslims present. Though the
tone and content might have been mocking, and indeed caused laughter in
the audience, ridicule was entirely different from arousing hatred. The con-
cluding remarks and message of the defendants' speech was to love the
Muslims and to convert them, with a clear message that religious belief
should be separated from persons who adhered to the particular belief. 174 In
addition, the Court specifically stated that although Muslim audiences
might have been offended, whether their feelings were to be protected was
not an issue before the court; the relevant question was whether hatred was
incited, not whether one was offended. 75 Given this extensive elaboration
168 Id., para. 159.
169 Id., para. 82.
170 Id., para. 95.
171 Id., para. 98.
172 Id.
173 Id., para. 113.
174 Id.
175 Id., para. 67.
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as to the correct application of the test, the case was remitted to the Tribunal
for reconsideration.
Section 8 of the Victorian statute appears stringent on the speaker
in that it does not consider the intention of the speaker, concentrating only
on the likely effect of the captured audience, which is not itself a test of
imminent outbreak of violence. Prima facie, it reads almost like a strict
liability test. Yet in application, and in interpreting Section 11, the Court is
lenient in looking for a subjective standard of honest belief and gives room
for the defense of genuine academic discussion. One may even find the
judgment unsatisfactory for leaving the murky boundary between mocking
one's religious belief and not heaping scorn on or inciting hatred against the
believers. The objective test of incitement of any ordinary member of the
audience is no clearer than the standard of the perception of a reasonable
member of the audience.
Despite these shortcomings, however, the Racial and Religious Tol-
erance Act has been praised for its genuine attempt to "balance freedom of
expression with an ethic of respect," allowing the public good defenses,
protecting religious groups other than Christians, and providing the much-
needed space for artistic expression. 176
V. FINE TUNING
The various instances of an overbroad exercise of free speech rights
with a view to inciting hatred or ridicule against selected minority commu-
nities in the global or the national context depicts the dangers posed by hate
speech. This is due to hate speech's socially invidious and divisive nature
given its ability to oppress and vilify sections of the populace and call out
for regulation of such speech specifically and separately in its own right. It
has the power to gnaw away at the dignity of individuals or even an entire
class of persons, preventing them from leading a dignified life with equal
respect and dignity. The ECtHR and the Australian Courts have made sig-
nificant inroads into embracing the right to have one's religious sensibilities
protected as an important aspect of the right to freedom of religion.
Indeed there is much to be said for the ECtHR's strategy of pro-
scribing speech that is intrinsically unworthy, as well as potentially socially
dangerous. Yet the direction, the precise tests for limiting such speech and
the extent of its regulation remains obscure, confused and unsettled. On the
other hand, the American approach of prohibition of any form of content-
176 Lawrence McNamara, Blasphemy, in LAW AND RELIGION 197, 212-213 (Peter
Radan, Denise Meyerson & Rosalind F. Croucher eds., 2005).
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based restriction is far too broad and can have dangerous and chilling impli-
cations for some groups in society.
There is a premium attached to the inherent good in allowing free
speech so that such a right should not be easily diluted; however, good
governance does not merely entail a hefty defense of free speech alone.
Good governance demands a commitment to the collective and all individu-
als and groups, all of whom are entitled to live with an expectation of equal
respect and dignity. These collective commitments influence governmental
policies towards such speech, especially hateful and derogatory speech, dic-
tating where the balance between prohibition and regulation ought to be
struck.
In search of striking the right balance, we continue to falter along
the battleground of freedom of religion and freedom of expression. As Lucy
Vickers points out, the conflict may be complicated by the clashes of three
rights: the perpetrator's right to freedom of expression, the rights of relig-
ious to be free from harassing, offensive or vilifying speech, and both par-
ties' right to freedom of religion; 177 the last situation occurs when the
perpetrator decides to proselytize in an offensive and aggressive manner to
followers of another religion as witnessed in the cases of Cantwell, 78
Chaplinsky179 and Kokkinakis. The interaction of these rights present scena-
rios and complications that are so rich and diverse that a ready made
formula to resolve which right should trump the others is hardly feasible. A
better solution, urged by various authors, is to identify the different interests
at stake, to weigh up the extent to which they would be trampled if the other
is given precedence and to locate the harm done to concerned parties in
each individual case.180
Building on the analysis and critique of the cases explored in this
paper, and the rationale underpinning the freedom of religion and freedom
of expression, it is submitted that there is no ready made formula that can
be judiciously applied across all situations. What is advocated in this paper
is the adoption of a contextualized approach, which examines the value of
that speech in that society, assessing the harm to the individuals or commu-
nity in light of that individual or community's standing in the greater soci-
ety. In general, freedom of expression should yield to freedom of religion if
177 Lucy Vickers, Is All Harassment Equal? The Case of Religious Harassment, 65
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 579, 589 (2006).
178 Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296.
179 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568.
180 See Fenwick and Phillipson, supra note 113 and Edge, supra note 19, at 684.
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(1) there is an intention to incite hatred and / or violence against an indi-
vidual or a particular group by reason of their affiliation with or mem-
bership of the religious group, idea or practice which is the subject of
the offender's remarks or conduct; and
(2) it is likely that violence will indeed occur; or
(3) the effect of the means or manner employed to oppose or deny certain
religious beliefs or practices are such as to inhibit those who hold such
beliefs or are somehow affiliated with the religion these beliefs or
practices form a part of, from exercising their freedom to hold, express
and practice such beliefs.
Even if the aforementioned conditions are met, a public interest defense,
including that of genuine artistic expression and genuine academic discus-
sion or honest belief in the value of the discussion, ought to be allowed.
This formulation does not mean that believers' feelings and beliefs
are being sidestepped. As beliefs should be open to criticism, the law
should only intervene if speech is so hostile that it would inhibit those who
hold such beliefs from exercising or manifesting their religion openly and
freely. For instance, when the environment in school, the workplace, or in a
community becomes so hostile that believers are subject to ridicule or
threats (such that they can no longer enjoy peacefully their right to practice
their faith), the state should interfere. Feelings of anger, fear and alienation
are a real risk to the wellbeing of any society. In those situations, it is no
longer an issue of preventing individuals from mere distress or guarding
their right not to be offended. Rather, what is at stake is a substantive en-
croachment of the right to manifest and practice one's religion, which ulti-
mately could become the root cause of internal instability and turmoil
within the society.
The three grounds set out to prohibit anti-religious speech are
closely interrelated. The British Government considers that incitement to
religious hatred "has a disproportionate and corrosive effect on communi-
ties, creating barriers between different groups and encouraging mistrust
and suspicion. At an individual level this can lead to fear and intimidation.
It can also lead indirectly to discrimination, abuse, harassment and ulti-
mately crimes of violence against members of our communities."'' 8'
VI. CONCLUSION
Freedom of religion and freedom of expression have been at logger-
heads for ages in different parts of the world. In mapping out the position of
181 Id. at 518 (quoting The 8th Report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights,
HL 60/HC 388 (2004-05) at 2.57).
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various arguments in the theoretical and practical battlefields in various ju-
risdictions, this paper argues that freedom of religion should be understood
to include the right to live in a community free of religious hatred so that
one can freely hold and express his religious belief, and that a delicate bal-
ance should be carefully struck between the two rights.
When these two fundamentally important constitutional rights are
in conflict, we are forced to side either with the offending speaker or the
targeted individual or groups who may be helpless and alone or an angry
mob.
Rather than focusing on who should be protected in this heated de-
bate, the ECtHR ventures deeper into the debate to assess the value of con-
cerned offensive speech. It points out that one cannot reasonably expect that
his or her beliefs be free from all criticism, denial or ridicule. Nevertheless,
the manner in which opposition to these ideas is manifested should not be
so powerful or 'rough' that believers are inhibited from exercising their
freedom to hold, express or manifest their religious beliefs. The ECtHR
examines diligently whether the speech at issue would contribute to matters
of public interest and public debate and denigrates speech that is motivated
by personal, cultural or emotional spite. Following this approach closely,
the Australian approach attempts to strike the difficult balance by empha-
sizing the likelihood of hatred being incited among the listening audience.
Intention and imminent danger are not required in civil lawsuits, but the
defense of public interest, including genuine artistic expression and aca-
demic discussion which rest on the subjective test of honesty, is allowed.
To adopt the libertarian or the dignity-oriented approach may yield
simplicity, predictability and certainty, yet the price to bear is too costly and
unfairly levied on either the religious or the outspoken. Drawing on the
experiences of the ECtHR and Victoria, Australia, the authors support a test
that requires proof of malicious intent to incite hatred or violence, criminal-
izing this conduct, a requirement that the likelihood of such hatred or vio-
lence towards the majority of the targeted group is shown, and making
allowance for the defenses of public interest, genuine artistic expression
and/or academic discussion. Successful implementation of this test will de-
pend heavily on an independent judiciary and a community that permits
rational discussion of controversial and sensitive questions.
In this battle between the free speakers and the religious groups, we
are confronted with a tough choice; not only of choosing between two
goods, but also determining which of these is the greater good in a pluralis-
tic society. Freedom of expression certainly has its limits, and respect for
religion also demands tolerance for difference, piercing criticism and offen-
sive mockery. As freedom of speech is a condition of legitimate govern-
ment, religious freedom and manifestation is core to one's identity and
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directly tied to the essential attributes of equality, dignity and individual
autonomy. A hostile environment would stifle the exercise and enjoyment
of this right and would contradict the principles of a true democracy. The
task of balancing in each individual case may be a task equivalent to that
which the Gods have given to Sisyphus, but until we start rolling the stone
uphill, the fine-tuning of any rational and reasonable principle will not be in
sight.

